2000 . T respass - Essential Factual Elements
[ Name of plaintiff ] claims that [ name of defendant ] trespassed on [his/her/
nonbinary pr onoun /its] property . T o establish this claim, [ name of plaintiff ]
must prove all of the following:
1. That [ name of plaintiff ] [owned/leased/occupied/controlled] the
2. That [ name of defendant ] [intentionally/, although not intending to
do so, [recklessly [or] negligently]] entered [ name of plaintiff ]’s
property] [or]
2. [intentionally/, although not intending to do so, [recklessly [or]
negligently]] caused [another person/[ insert name of thing ]] to
enter [ name of plaintiff ]’s property];
3. That [ name of plaintiff ] did not give permission for the entry [or
that [ name of defendant ] exceeded [ name of plaintiff ]’s permission];
4. That [ name of plaintiff ] was [actually] harmed; and
5. That [ name of defendant ]’s [entry/conduct] was a substantial
factor in causing [ name of plaintiff ]’s harm.
[Entry can be on, above, or below the surface of the land.]
[Entry may occur indir ectly , such as by causing vibrations that damage
the land or structur es or other improvements on the land.]
New September 2003; Revised June 2013, May 2020
Directions for Use
W ith regard to element 2, liability for trespass may be imposed for conduct that is
intentional, reckless, negligent, or the result of an extra-hazardous activity . ( Staples
v . Hoefke (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1397, 1406 [235 Cal.Rptr . 165].) However , intent
to trespass means only that the person intended to be in the particular place where
the trespass is alleged to have occurred. ( Miller v . National Broadcasting Corp.
(1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1463, 1480-1481 [232 Cal.Rptr . 668].) Liability may be also
based on the defendant’ s unintentional, but negligent or reckless, act, for example,
an automobile accident. An intent to damage is not necessary . ( Meyer v . Pacific
Employers Insurance Co. (1965) 233 Cal.App.2d 321, 326 [43 Cal.Rptr . 542].)
It is no defense that the defendant mistakenly , but in good faith, believed that the
defendant had a right to be in that location. ( Cassinos v . Union Oil Co. (1993) 14
Cal.App.4th 1770, 1780 [18 Cal.Rptr .2d 574].) In such a case, the word
“intentionally” in element 2 might be confusing to the jury . T o alleviate this possible
confusion, give the third option to CACI No. 2004, “Intentional Entry” Explained .
If plaintif f is seeking nominal damages as an alternative to actual damages, insert
the following paragraph above element 4, add “and” at the end of element 2, and
adjust punctuation accordingly:
If you find all of the above, then the law assumes that [ name of plaintiff ] has
been harmed and [ name of plaintiff ] is entitled to a nominal sum such as one
dollar . [ Name of plaintiff ] is entitled to additional damages if [ name of plaintiff ]
proves the following:
The last sentence of the above paragraph, along with the final two elements of this
instruction, should be omitted if plaintif f is seeking nominal damages only . Read
“actually” in the fourth element only if nominal damages are also being sought.
Nominal damages alone are not available in cases involving intangible intrusions
such as noise and vibrations; proof of actual damage to the property is required:
“[T]he rule is that actionable trespass may not be predicated upon nondamaging
noise, odor , or light intrusion . . . .” ( San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v . Superior
Court (1996) 13 Cal.4th 893, 936 [55 Cal.Rptr .2d 724, 920 P .2d 669], internal
citation omitted.)
For an instruction on control of property , see CACI No. 1002, Extent of Contr ol
Over Premises Ar ea , in the Premises Liability series.
Sources and Authority
• “Generally , landowners and tenants have a right to exclude persons from
trespassing on private property; the right to exclude persons is a fundamental
aspect of private property ownership.” ( Ralphs Gr ocery Co. v . V ictory
Consultants, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 258 [225 Cal.Rptr .3d 305].)
• “ ‘T respass is an unlawful interference with possession of property .’ The
elements of trespass are: (1) the plaintif f’ s ownership or control of the property;
(2) the defendant’ s intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto the property; (3)
lack of permission for the entry or acts in excess of permission; (4) harm; and
(5) the defendant’ s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. (See
CACI No. 2000.)” ( Ralphs Gr ocery Co., supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at pp. 261-262,
internal citation omitted.)
• “[I]n order to state a cause of action for trespass a plaintif f must allege an
unauthorized and tangible entry on the land of another , which interfered with the
plaintif f’ s exclusive possessory rights.” ( McBride v . Smith (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th
1 160, 1 174 [227 Cal.Rptr .3d 390].)
• “The emission of sound waves which cause actual physical damage to property
constitutes a trespass. Liability for trespass may be imposed for conduct which is
intentional, reckless, negligent or the result of an extra-hazardous activity .”
( Staples , supra , 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 1406, internal citations omitted.)
• “California’ s definition of trespass is considerably narrower than its definition of
nuisance. ‘ “A trespass is an invasion of the interest in the exclusive possession
of land, as by entry upon it . . . . A nuisance is an interference with the interest
in the private use and enjoyment of the land and does not require interference
TRESP ASS CACI No. 2000
with the possession.” ’ California has adhered firmly to the view that ‘[t]he cause
of action for trespass is designed to protect possessory - not necessarily
ownership - interests in land from unlawful interference.’ ” ( Capogeannis v .
Superior Court (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 668, 674 [15 Cal.Rptr .2d 796], internal
citations omitted.)
• “In the context of a trespass action, ‘possession’ is synonymous with
‘occupation’ and connotes a subjection of property to one’ s will and control.”
( V eiseh v . Stapp (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1 105 [247 Cal.Rptr .3d 868].)
• “ ‘[A] trespass may be committed by the continued presence on the land of a
structure, chattel, or other thing which the actor has tortiously placed there,
whether or not the actor has the ability to remove it.’ Under this definition,
‘tortious conduct’ denotes that conduct, whether of act or omission, which
subjects the actor to liability under the principles of the law of torts.” ( Newhall
Land & Farming Co. v . Superior Court (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 334, 345 [23
Cal.Rptr .2d 377], internal citations omitted.)
• The common-law distinction between direct and constructive trespass is not
followed in California. A trespass may be committed by consequential and
indirect injuries as well as by direct and forcible harm. ( Gallin v . Poulou (1956)
140 Cal.App.2d 638, 641 [295 P .2d 958].)
• “ ‘It is a well-settled proposition that the proper party plaintif f in an action for
trespass to real property is the person in actual possession. No averment of title
in plaintif f is necessary . [Citations.]’ . . . ‘A defendant who is a mere stranger to
the title will not be allowed to question the title of a plaintif f in possession of
the land. It is only where the trespasser claims title himself, or claims under the
real owner , that he is allowed to attack the title of the plaintif f whose peaceable
possession he has disturbed.’ ” ( V eiseh, supra , 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 1 104,
internal citation omitted.)
• “An action for trespass may technically be maintained only by one whose right
to possession has been violated; however , an out-of-possession property owner
may recover for an injury to the land by a trespasser which damages the
ownership interest.” ( Smith v . Cap Concrete, Inc. (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 769,
774 [184 Cal.Rptr . 308], internal citation omitted.)
• “Under the forcible entry statutes the fact that a defendant may have title or the
right to possession of the land is no defense. The plainti ff’ s interest in peaceable
even if wrongful possession is secured against forcible intrusion by conferring
on him the right to restitution of the premises, the primary remedy , and
incidentally awarding damages proximately caused by the forcible entry .” ( Allen
v . McMillion (1978) 82 Cal.App.3d 211, 218-219 [147 Cal.Rptr . 77], internal
citations omitted.)
• “Where there is a consensual entry , there is no tort, because lack of consent is
an element of the wrong.” ( Civic W estern Corp. v . Zila Industries, Inc. (1977) 66
Cal.App.3d 1, 16-17 [135 Cal.Rptr . 915].)
• “ ‘A conditional or restricted consent to enter land creates a privilege to do so
CACI No. 2000 TRESP ASS
only insofar as the condition or restriction is complied with.’ ” ( Civic W estern
Corp., supra, 66 Cal.App.3d at p. 17, quoting Rest.2d T orts, § 168.)
• “Where one has permission to use land for a particular purpose and proceeds to
abuse the privilege, or commits any act hostile to the interests of the lessor , he
becomes a trespasser . [¶] ‘A good faith belief that entry has been authorized or
permitted provides no excuse for infringement of property rights if consent was
not in fact given by the property owner whose rights are at issue. Accordingly ,
by showing they gave no authorization, [plaintif fs] established the lack of
consent necessary to support their action for injury to their ownership
interests.’ ” ( Cassinos , supra , 14 Cal.App.4th at p. 1780, internal citations
• “ ‘[T]he intent required as a basis for liability as a trespasser is simply an intent
to be at the place on the land where the trespass allegedly occurred . . . . The
defendant is liable for an intentional entry although he has acted in good faith,
under the mistaken belief, however reasonable, that he is committing no
wrong.’ ” ( Miller , supra , 187 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1480-1481, internal citation
• “The general rule is simply that damages may be recovered for annoyance and
distress, including mental anguish, proximately caused by a trespass.” ( Armitage
v . Decker (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 887, 905 [267 Cal.Rptr . 399], internal citations
• “Causes of action for conversion and trespass support an award for exemplary
damages.” ( Krieger v . Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 137,
148 [173 Cal.Rptr . 751], internal citation omitted.)
• “It is true that an action for trespass will support an award of nominal damages
where actual damages are not shown. However , nominal damages need not be
awarded where no actual loss has occurred. ‘Failure to return a verdict for
nominal damages is not in general ground for reversing a judgment or granting a
new trial.’ ” ( Staples, supra, 189 Cal.App.3d at p. 1406, internal citations
• “T respass may be ‘ “by personal intrusion of the wrongdoer or by his failure to
leave; by throwing or placing something on the land; or by causing the entry of
some other person.” ’ A trespass may be on the surface of the land, above it, or
below it. The migration of pollutants from one property to another may
constitute a trespass, a nuisance, or both.” ( Martin Marietta Corp. v . Insurance
Co. of North America (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 11 13, 1 132 [47 Cal.Rptr .2d 670],
internal citations omitted.)
• “Respondent’ s plant was located in a zone which permitted its operation. It
comes within the protection of section 731a of the Code of Civil Procedure
which, subject to certain exceptions, generally provides that where a
manufacturing or commercial operation is permitted by local zoning, no private
individual can enjoin such an operation. It has been determined, however , that
this section does not operate to bar recovery for damages for trespassory
TRESP ASS CACI No. 2000
invasions of another ’ s property occasioned by the conduct of such manufacturing
or commercial use.” ( Roberts v . Permanente Corp . (1961) 188 Cal.App.2d 526,
529 [10 Cal.Rptr . 519], internal citations omitted.)
• “[A]s a matter of law , [plaintif f] cannot state a cause of action against the
[defendants] for trespassing on the Secondary Access Easement because they
own that land and her easement does not give her a possessory right, not to
mention an exclusive possessory right in that property .” ( McBride , supra , 18
Cal.App.5th at p. 1 174.)
• “[A] failure to comply with one or more provisions of the California Uniform
T ransfers to Minors Act does not render the grantor ’ s continued possession and
control of the real property unlawful for purposes of the tort of trespass to
realty .” ( V eiseh, supra , 35 Cal.App.5th at p. 1107.)
Secondary Sources
5 W itkin, Summary of California Law (1 1th ed. 2017) T orts, §§ 803-805
2 Levy et al., California T orts, Ch. 17, Nuisance and T r espass , § 17.20 (Matthew
48 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 550, T respass , §§ 550.1 1, 550.19
(Matthew Bender)
22 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 225, T respass , § 225.20 (Matthew Bender)
1 California Civil Practice: T orts §§ 18:1, 18:4-18:8, 18:10 (Thomson Reuters)
CACI No. 2000 TRESP ASS
Page last reviewed May 2024
Amherst professor Austin Sarat discusses the case of Richard Glossip, an Oklahoma death row inmate whose conviction has been challenged by the state’s attorney general, and the broader constitutional question of executing innocent people.
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